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We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and 
the effect of the worker’s effort on the manager’s payoff. The results indicate  a strong 
complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent’s ability to “repay the gift”. We 
collect information on ability to control for differences and on reciprocal inclination to show 
that gift exchange is more effective with more reciprocal agents.  We present a simple 
principal-agent model with reciprocal subjects that motivates  our empirical findings. Our 
results offer an avenue to reconcile the recent conflicting evidence on the efficacy of gift 
exchange outside the lab; we suggest that the significance of gift exchange relations depends 
on details of the environment. 
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Firms must frequently address the problem of providing incentives to employees when actions
are not at all or hardly contractible. The standard approach in economics has been to
focus on analyzing the optimal explicit incentive schemes - tying the level of the worker's
compensation to the amount of output produced, which serves as a (noisy) measure of
employee e®ort.1 However, the importance of fairness and social preferences, especially for
the work relation, has long been documented. Starting with Akerlof (1982) a literature has
developed that considers gift exchange as an alternative source of incentives in the workplace
as (some) workers respond to generous treatment by the ¯rm (i.e. generous wage levels) by
exerting above minimal e®ort.
Recently there have been con°icting results on the signi¯cance of gift exchange as a moti-
vating force outside of the lab. The varying e®ectiveness of gift exchange in di®erent settings
suggests that the e±cacy of gift exchange incentives depends on details of the environment.
We add to this research by providing results that suggest an avenue to reconcile those ¯nd-
ings. In our ¯eld experiment we do not ¯nd evidence for an overall positive e®ort response
merely from an initial wage gift. However, the gift's e±cacy is substantially improved if
the manager bene¯ts more strongly from a worker's high e®ort. That is, gift exchange can
induce e®ort if workers are able to repay the gift to the manager. Moreover, we document
that gift exchange works more e®ectively with subjects that we classify as reciprocal via a
personality test, and that the e±cacy of gift exchange does not dissipate over the course of
the experiment. We conclude from our results that while gift exchange may not be e®ective
as an incentive in all settings, it can be a powerful incentive device in the proper job context,
such as in our setting when managers have performance-related incentives, and when it is
directed to the right employees, who are most likely to be reciprocal.
For our ¯eld experiment we hired temporary workers for a data entry job. The workers
entered historical data from the 1849 Prussian Census. In total we had 59 workers entering
data during a 5 hour shift in the Harvard Business School computer lab where the data entry
took place. The job was advertised to the worker by a temp worker agency at the standard
hourly wage of $13, however for 30 of the workers we increased it to $18 upon their arrival.
We explained to them that we were hired by two professors to organize the entry of these
data. For 15 workers in each the $13 and the $18 group we emphasized the importance of
them working hard for us by explaining that we would receive a bonus of 50% if the job was
done `by the end of the week' (Bonus treatment). For the `control' groups in both the $13
and the $18 conditions we did not inform the workers of this bonus (No Bonus treatment).
1An extensive theoretical literature, e.g. HolmstrÄ om (1979) or Grossman and Hart (1983), has emphasized
the importance of strong monetary incentives to induce e®ort.
1We also asked the workers to ¯ll out a short version of the Big 5 personality test, to give us
a measure of non-cognitive skills.
In line with previous ¯eld experiments, we do not ¯nd an e®ort increase in response to the
higher wage in the No Bonus treatment. However, for the workers in the Bonus treatment,
a higher wage leads to a signi¯cant increase in worker output. Hence, there is a strong
complementarity between the wage gift and the resulting payo® for the manager.2 Further-
more, when we separate workers based on their agreeableness (a personality trait associated
with standard lab measures of reciprocity), we ¯nd that the positive e®ect of high wages
on e®ort is driven entirely by highly agreeable (strong positive reciprocity) workers, with
low reciprocity workers showing either a zero or a negative response to a higher wage. We
consider the ¯nding that the strength of gift exchange is positively correlated with measures
of reciprocal inclination as absolutely necessary to lend credibility to gift exchange based
explanations of motivation in the labor market. Though apparently obvious, to the best of
our knowledge this has not been documented previously in the ¯eld. We also examine the
strength of the gift exchange response over time. In contrast to other studies, e.g. Gneezy
and List (2006), we ¯nd no weakening of positive responses to wage gifts over time. To the
contrary, any negative e®ects of the wage gift disappear in the later stages of the task and
we ¯nd an overall strongly positive e®ect of our treatment manipulations in the second half
of the experiment.
We use two di®erent measures of e®ort in our analysis: gross data entered and an error
corrected measure of data entered. The estimates derived from these two measures are
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar, suggesting that any e®ort responses work along
the quantity margin only, leaving the quality margin of e®ort una®ected.3
We can rationalize these results with an agency model capturing reciprocal preferences
where we show that there is complementarity between gift and ability to repay the gift. In
the model a risk neutral ¯rm hires a risk averse worker to exert non-veri¯able e®ort. The
novel feature of the model is that the worker is reciprocal - i.e. the worker's utility increases
in the principal's pro¯t whenever the worker receives a rent in excess of his outside option.
Thus, when the ¯rm is generous to the worker by giving him additional compensation, the
worker desires to provide in turn something of value to the ¯rm. The worker's reciprocal
attitude can now be used by the ¯rm to align the worker's preferences with those of the ¯rm,
thus generating intrinsic motivation. The comparative statics show that ceteris paribus the
worker's optimal e®ort choice increases in the initial wage gift and his ability to repay the
gift. The corresponding cross derivative is also positive, indicating the complementarity of
2This results is akin to the ¯ndings summarized in Ichniowsky and Shaw (2003) on the complementarities
between various HR policy instruments.
3This is in contrast to Kim and Slonim (2009) who ¯nd gift exchange mainly along the quality margin.
2the instruments.
An extensive body of evidence has developed, demonstrating reciprocal behavior and gift
exchange in laboratory experiments. Fehr and Falk (2008) summarize results from earlier
studies and highlight several key results: i) Average wages in the experiments are above the
minimal wages and leave workers with rents. ii) There is a positive wage-e®ort relationship.
iii) These results are robust to various institutions, to competition, and to high stakes4.
Two recent laboratory experiments are closely related to our paper. Hennig-Schmidt et
al. (2010) present a real-e®ort laboratory experiment and show that a positive wage-e®ort
relation as implied by gift exchange only prevails if information on the manager's surplus is
provided to the experimental workers. This indicates, as predicted by our model, that the
manager's surplus is an important determinant of the e®ectiveness of gift exchange relations.
Note, however, that Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010) do not vary the surplus accruing to the
manager nor do they collect the additional information necessary to test our hypotheses.
Englmaier and Leider (2009) also analyze the importance of the ability of the worker to
\repay the gift" to the manager and conduct a real-e®ort laboratory experiment where they
vary the wage and the e®ect of the worker's e®ort on the manager's payo®. They are able
to con¯rm predictions about which is the marginal worker (in terms of ability) a®ected by
their experimental variation and how di®erent types of individuals, sel¯sh and reciprocal,
react to it.
Recently there has been a controversial discussion about the validity of the lab results
for gift exchange in the ¯eld. We take the mixed ¯ndings of these studies as evidence
that the e±cacy of gift exchange depends on subtle details of the ¯eld situation. While
Falk (2007) ¯nds strong evidence for gift exchange in a ¯eld experiment with charitable
donations, Gneezy and List (2006) have recently argued that the e®ect of gift exchange
in the ¯eld is only minor, fast disappearing and overall not a viable employment strategy.
In Gneezy and List students are hired for a day job in a library and half of them get a
surprise rise of their hourly pay. Gneezy and List document that, other than in our ¯eld
experiment, there is only a short lived e®ect of this gift on the students' e®ort. Overall
the `¯rm' would have fared better hiring more students for the lower wage rate.5 Kube
et al. (2007) replicate the Gneezy and List study and also ¯nd no e®ect of a wage gift
but document a strong negative e®ect in response to a wage cut. In a comparable design,
Kube et al. (2011) document a strong positive e®ect of non-monetary gifts on students'
e®ort. Note that in neither of these cases the subjects were given any indication that the
manager who provided the higher wage would bene¯t directly from increased productivity
4For further reference see also Fehr and GÄ achter (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and the references
therein.
5Gneezy and List (2006) ¯nd very similar results for a fund raising task.
3and the performed jobs were not ones where an employee would expect such a compensation
structure. Bellemare and Shearer (2009) analyze gift exchange within a real ¯rm (where the
value of output is clear to the workers). In their study, there is a surprise bonus for the
workers in a tree planting ¯rm in British Columbia. Their results indicate a 10% increase in
worker productivity on average which slowly dwindles down. Moreover the e®ect of the gift is
more marked if the worker has been with the ¯rm for longer. Hence, Bellemare and Shearer
argue that spot market ¯eld experiments only establish a lower bound of the e®ects of gift
exchange in real ¯rms that are characterized by longstanding and ongoing relations that
amplify the e®ects. Analyzing representative survey data, Leuven et al. (2005) document
that ¯rms with a more reciprocal work force (as measured within the survey) are more likely
to provide their workers with general training as they deem it more likely that this gift will
be repaid within an ongoing relation. Finally, Kim and Slonim (2009) run a hybrid lab-¯eld
experiment where participants entered survey data for a well-known charitable organization.
Workers received either a high or low ¯xed wage framed as either fair or unfair. While the
fairness manipulation did not a®ect the quantity or quality of work, the wage gift had an
e®ect on the quality of the work but not the quantity. These results are in contrast to ours
as we ¯nd an e®ect of our manipulations on the quantity but not the quality margin.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the design of
the ¯eld experiment. Section 3 derives the theoretical predictions and Sections 4 and 5
present and discuss the results. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains derivations and
illustrations.
2 Experimental Design
The ¯eld experiment took place on the premises of the CLER lab at Harvard Business
School where we provided subjects with computer work stations. We ran four sessions in
September 2007. Though subjects were situated within one room, the lay out was such that
they could not monitor each others' work progress. Moreover, though we did not formally
forbid communication, we did not note any signs of more than casual communication. Hence
we conclude that there is only very limited scope for peer e®ects a®ecting our results. In total
we had 59 participants, each of them working for approximately ¯ve hours on a single day.
The participants were hired via a temp worker agency that regularly works with Harvard
Business School6. We told the temp workers that we have been hired to organize a data
6Atrium Sta±ng of Boston, http://www.atriumsta®.com/, describes their services as follows: \Since
1995, Atrium's O±ce Support Practice has been the ¯rm's stronghold. Our team of skilled recruiters,
who themselves draw from diverse career backgrounds, are experts in identifying administrative talent and
understanding client needs. Our thorough screening processes ensure that we know our Associates well. Our
4entry project. These workers frequently work on similar data entry projeccts, hence there is
no reason to believe that they suspected they were participating in a ¯eld experiment. Their
job was to enter data from the 1849 Prussian Census into an Excel template.7
We created four treatment cells (Low Wage/No Bonus, High Wage/No Bonus, Low Wage/Bonus,
High Wage/Bonus) based on the wage level and the bonus information. Workers were either
payed the standard wage ($13/hr) as advertised by the temp agency, or were \surprised"
with a higher wage ($18/hr). In the baseline No Bonus treatments, we told the participants
only that we were hired \by two professors to organize the entry of these data". In the Bonus
treatment groups we additionally inform the temps that we get a substantial \completion
bonus" if enough work gets done.8 These \bonus" treatments indicate whether the value of
e®ort to the manager matters.
From the temp agency we get demographic information on the workers which we use as
controls. Most importantly we have a measure of the workers' typing speed (Typing Score)
which we use to control for the temp workers' di®ering typing ability, a key determinant for
productivity in this task. The ¯nal payment of the temp workers was done in cash directly
at the end of each entry session.
Given that there are no previous papers using this task or treatment variation, we were not
able to calibrate the magnitude of the pay rise and the completion bonus in order to ¯nd
the optimal combination to maximize gift exchange - as such our results should not be seen
as an upper bound on the e±cacy of reciprocal incentives. However, we are fairly certain
that all participants considered pay rise and completion bonus as \substantial"
3 A Model of Reciprocal Motivation
Our experiment is not designed to di®erentiate exactly between di®erent models of social
preferences. Hence we do not interpret our ¯ndings as a strict test of our model, but rather
consider the model to be a valuable frame within which to organize the data. We consider a
simpli¯ed version of the model in Englmaier and Leider (2011) where we solve the full moral
hazard problem and derive the structure of the optimal contract in a standard principal
agent problem with reciprocal agents. To lay out our model, we assume there is a risk
neutral manager who wants to maximize expected pro¯ts and one risk averse worker who
customized approach to client searches results in impressive hire retention rate of over 93%. We sta® direct
hire, temp-to-hire and temporary administrative roles in a variety of companies."
7An example from the 1849 Prussian Census can be found in Figure 2 in Appendix C.
8In order to not deceive the subjects on this issue we arranged with one of the providers of the Prussian
Census Data, Sascha Becker, to put such a pay scheme in place. Our actual \completion bonus" came in
the form of free lunch and was worth roughly $10.
5cares about reciprocity. The worker can take an action (e®ort) a ¸ 0 with corresponding
costs of e®ort c(a) with c0 (a) > 0;c0 (0) = 0; and c00 (a) > 0:
The actions imply a respective expected return for the manager ER(a) with ER0(a) >
0;ER00(a) · 0. In order to capture our experimental variation we introduce the scalar M
which re°ects the monetary value of output, i.e. M ¢ER(ai) is the expected monetary gross
return for the manager from action ai.
A contract (w;^ a) is a ¯xed wage payment w, as well as an unenforceable request for an
action ^ a. In a real world context we could think of ^ a as an informal job description or a code
of conduct. In the experiment we will interpret ^ a as an exogenously given and commonly
understood norm. Given our focus here on changes in behavior these details are not key to
our results. While ^ a is not binding, it serves to ¯x the worker's beliefs about the manager's
intended generosity (since the expected utility of a contract depends on the worker's action).
The worker's inherent concern for reciprocity is measured by ´ 2 [0;+1). The worker's
utility function given that he takes action a, under the contract ( ~ w;^ a), is given by
U ( ~ w;a;^ a) = u( ~ w) ¡ c(a) + ´ (u( ~ w) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u) ¢ M ¢ (ER(a) ¡ ~ w)
where ¹ u is the worker's outside option in the labor market. The utility function captures,
albeit in a simplistic form, the core idea of reciprocal motivation: If an individual has been
treated kindly, he will want to reciprocate in kind.9 The function consists of three parts:
i) utility from the monetary wage payment u(~ w); ii) e®ort costs c(a); and iii) reciprocal
utility ´ (u( ~ w) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)M ¢(ER(a) ¡ ~ w) where ´ measures the intensity of the reciprocal
preferences.
A \generous" contract is one that provides a rent to the worker, i.e. an expected monetary
utility in excess of the worker's outside option. A more generous contract will induce the
worker to feel more reciprocal, which here means that he will derive greater marginal and
absolute utility from the manager's pro¯t. Assuming that the contract is generous, the
worker's optimal e®ort choice a¤ for a given contract is implicitly de¯ned by the ¯rst order
condition




¤) + ´ (u( ~ w) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)M ¢ ER
0(a
¤) = 0:
Applying the implicit function theorem we can derive the relevant comparative statics w.r.t.
~ w and M which are positive as is the cross partial w.r.t. ~ w and M, indicating that they are
complements10. Note, as M and ´, the concern for reciprocity, always appear together, the
9Rabin (1993), for simultaneous move games, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and
Fischbacher (2006), for sequential games, have developed powerful and very general models of reciprocal
preferences.
10See Appendix A for the derivations and a parameterized example.
6e®ect of varying ´ is the same as the e®ect of varying M. The following Lemma 1 summarizes
these results.
Lemma 1 (Reciprocity) For a generous contract, (u( ~ w) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u) > 0, the worker's
optimal action a¤ is implicitly de¯ned by the ¯rst order condition




¤) + ´ (u( ~ w) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u) ¢ M ¢ ER
0(a
¤) = 0:
It is increasing in ~ w, i.e. @a¤
@ ~ w > 0, increasing in M, i.e. @a¤
@M > 0, increasing in ´, i.e.
@a¤
@´ > 0, and ~ w and M are complements, i.e. @2a¤
@ ~ w@M > 0.
The intuition for the complementarity is fairly straightforward from the utility function.
Increasing the wage leaves a larger rent to the worker and increases the weight he gives to
the managers welfare. Due to the multiplicative structure, the worker ¯nds it more attractive
to work harder when he has a stronger impact on the manager's surplus.
Contrasting this with the standard model of preferences, ´ = 0, the ¯rst order condition
simpli¯es to





which is always negative as obviously with °at wages the worker's utility unambiguously
decreases in his e®ort choice and his optimal action a¤
standard is trivially given by a¤
standard = 0:
Increasing M or ~ w does have no e®ect on a¤
standard = 0: This is summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Standard Preferences) a¤
Standard = 0 and the corresponding comparative stat-













Summarizing the results from our model we can formulate the following predictions that we
try to validate in our experimental analysis. The ¯rst three follow directly from Lemma 1:
Prediction 1 E®ort is increasing in wage ~ w.
Prediction 2 E®ort is increasing in managerial payo® M.
Prediction 3 Managerial payo® and wage are complementary in their e®ect on e®ort,
@a¤2
@ ~ w@M > 0.
The next prediction is straightforward: reciprocal incentives via gift exchange work better
for more reciprocally inclined subjects. In particular, low reciprocity individuals should be
7Table 1: Means - Data Entry Rate (Chars/min) by Treatment
Employee Manager Data Entry Rate Accuraccy Corrected Rate # of
Wage Bonus Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs.
$13/hour No 29.71 25.52 16.12 28.02 23.65 15.32 14
$18/hour No 23.47 19.83 11.47 21.92 19.42 10.57 15
$13/hour Yes 24.38 23.40 9.21 23.06 22.09 9.11 15
$18/hour Yes 28.36 29.25 8.42 26.72 27.48 8.24 15
The table shows the average data entry rate, measured as characters/minute (Data Entry Rate) or as
correct characters/minute (Accuracy Corrected Rate), as well as the median rate and the standard
deviation broken up by treatment.
unlikely to exhibit a positive response to high wages, as their utility from providing e®ort
for the principal is very low compared to their cost of e®ort. High reciprocity individuals,
however, are more likely to have a su±ciently strong utility bene¯t from returning the gift
to induce e®ort.
Prediction 4 The positive e®ort response to a wage gift or a manager bonus is more pro-
nounced for more reciprocally inclined (higher ´) subjects.
4 Experimental Results
Our main performance measure is subjects' data entry rate, i.e. the number of characters
of data entered per minute.11 As a robustness check, in our regressions we also report the
accuracy corrected data entry rate.12 In Table 1 we present the mean and median entry
rates for the whole shift. Subjects' overall productivity suggests that o®ering a high wage
in the No Bonus treatments had a negative impact on e®ort while it had a positive e®ect in
the Bonus treatments. We test this e®ect statistically in the analysis that follows.
11The Prussian Census has two volumes which di®er slightly in their content, in particular in the number
of cells/line and the average number of characters/cell. To control for these di®erences we convert the
number of cells (which is our basic measure of performance) into characters entered by weighing cells with
the average number of characters/cell in the respective volume. Alternatively, we can also directly control for
the Volume by adding a dummy variable and keeping cells as the measure. These results are quantitatively
and qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
12To construct this measure we repeat the exercise used to construct the data entry rate, i.e. we convert
the number of correctly entered cells into characters entered by weighing cells with the average number of
characters/cell in the respective volume.
8Table 2: Means - Typing Score
Employee Manager Typing Score # of
Wage Bonus Mean Median St. Dev. Obs.
$13/hour No 57,93 52,50 17,46 14
$18/hour No 48,80 46,00 13,97 15
$13/hour Yes 48,27 48,00 14,35 15
$18/hour Yes 56,20 53,00 16,83 15
The table shows the average Typing Score as provided by the temp agency, as well as the median rate and
the standard deviation broken up by treatment.
Figure 1 shows how productivity, measured in 10 minute intervals, evolves over time in the
four treatment conditions. Though the levels di®er, there seems to be no di®erence in the
time trend. There is learning in all four treatments for the ¯rst hour, then productivity is
fairly °at until the very end where there is a steep drop in all treatments. This drop is mostly
'technical': subjects ¯nished a line and did not start a new one that they were unlikely to
¯nish before the end of their shift.
As can be seen in Table 2 there are considerable di®erences in underlying ability (i.e. typing
speed score) between treatments. Hence, a direct comparison of the overall productivity
between treatments is somewhat misleading. We address this below by directly controlling
for ability in our main regressions.
Regression Analysis of Treatment E®ects
Our sample size in terms of participating subjects is only somewhat bigger than in previous
studies, e.g. Gneezy and List (2006) or Bellemare and Shearer (2009), but importantly,
our design allows us to use detailled additional information to more precisely estimate the
treatment e®ects. Most importantly we have a measure of data entry ability from the
temp agency. The agency has temp workers take a typing speed test upon hiring, and
they made this information, as well as additional demographic information, available to us.
Since Table 2 indicates substantial heterogeneity in the underlying ability distribution across
treatments we proceed by including controls for worker ability. Additionally, we have worker
productivity at 10 minute and 30 minute intervals. We will use the 10 minute data as units
of observation in the paper. The results for the 30 minute data are quantitatively similar












































































The y-axis shows the average data entry rates (characters/minute) by treatment for the 10min sub-periods.
$13/Low refers to the 13$ Wage/No Bonus treatment., $18/Low refers to the 18$ Wage/No Bonus
treatment, etc.
but less precisely estimated and are available upon request.13 Table 3 presents the results of
a GLS estimate with a heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1) errors. A Wooldridge test
for serial correlation ¯nds signi¯cant autocorrelation (p > 0:001) while a Likelihood Ratio
test suggests panel heteroskedasticity (p < 0:001).
The two alternate e®ort measures presented in speci¯cations (1) and (2) in Table 3 give
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar estimates, suggesting that the response to the
treatment variations does not a®ect quality but only in°uences the quantity margin. Con-
trary to the fundamental gift exchange intuition, we ¯nd a signi¯cant and negative e®ect
of the wage gift on e®ort and no signi¯cant e®ect of the manager bonus. However, the
interaction High Wage X Manager Bonus is signi¯cantly positive and large in size, result-
ing in overall positive gift exchange in the Bonus treatment. That is, the e®ect of a wage
gift depends importantly on the characteristics of the job context, and there is a strong
13Gneezy and List (2006) and Kim and Slonim (2009) use the same units of observation. Our performance
measure is constructed from information when whole lines of the census were ¯nished. These lines took
several minutes to be completely entered. To smooth our data, we proceed as follows: If a line was started
x minutes before the end of the n-th 10 minute subperiod and ¯nished in the y-th minute of the (n+1)-th
10 minute subperiod, we account x/(x+y) of the characters of this line to the n-th and y/(x+y) of the
characters of this line to the (n+1)-th 10 minute subperiod.
10Table 3: Regression: Performance (10 min. Periods)
(1) (2)
Data Entry Accuracy
VARIABLES Rate Corrected Rate
Typing Speed Test Score 0.220*** 0.203***
(0.0272) (0.0259)
Temps Paid High Wage -3.531*** -3.355***
(1.118) (1.063)
Manager Bonus -1.526 -0.994
(1.357) (1.303)








Number of subject 57 57
Total E®ect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 2.925** 2.469**
(1.214) (1.168)
We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1)
correlation. Demographic Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and
student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signi¯cance is denoted: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p <0.1
11complementarity between the wage gift and the magnitude of the managerial payo®.14
Treatment E®ects by Agreeableness
As we have information on workers' scores in a Big 5 personality test, we can analyze how
e®ects vary along this dimension. In particular, we identify subjects who score highly on
the trait \agreeableness", which has been shown experimentally to relate to standard lab
measures of reciprocity (see Ben-Ner et al. 2004, Ashton et al. 1997).15 As opposed to the
trust game or other lab measures of reciprocity, personality tests like the Big 5 are quite
common in the hiring practices of ¯rms. In particular, high agreeableness corresponds with
one of the criteria Autor and Scarborough (2008) identify in the hiring practice of the ¯rm
they study.16
Separating our subjects along the agreeableness (reciprocity) dimension allows us to exam-
ine whether our e®ects are in fact driven by the reciprocal subjects, as suggested by our
model. Note that there is no correlation between our agreeableness measure and the Typing
Speed Test Score (Spearmen ½ = 0:0482, p = 0:7170). Table 4 shows our basic regression
analysis for the sample split into highly agreeable (strongly reciprocal; top third) and low
agreeable (weakly reciprocal; bottom two thirds) workers.17 Again, there are substantial
di®erences in the response to the treatment variation across the agreeableness dimension.
The negative response to the wage gift in the No Bonus treatment is driven entirely by
the low agreeableness workers. Additionally, the low agreeableness workers have no overall
response to the wage gift in the Bonus treatment. However, high agreeableness workers have
a neutral response to the wage gift in the No Bonus treatment, and a signi¯antly positive
response in the Bonus treatment (indicated by the signi¯cant total e®ect reported at the
bottom of Table 4.) As such, our results are consistent with our model that response to
a wage gift should come primarily from reciprocal workers. What remains puzzling is the
strong negative e®ect of the wage gift among the low agreeable subjects. We will return to
14Relaxing our speci¯cation by allowing for non-linear e®ects of ability, we estimate a speci¯cation with
separate dummies for the lowest, middle and highest terciles of ability. We ¯nd very similar coe±cients
that can be found in Table 6 in Appendix B. Note that the results in Table 6 indeed suggest non-linear
e®ects of ability with the middle tercile not being di®erent from the top tercile but the bottom tercile being
signi¯cantly slower.
15While Ben-Ner et al. (2004) and Ashton et al. (1997) also ¯nd some evidence that \openness" and
\emotional stability" may relate to reciprocity as well, the relationship between reciprocity and agreeableness
was most robust across speci¯cation and sample. The results in Englmaier and Leider (2009) also show this
correlation.
16The ¯rm gave hiring preference to applicants with positive z-scores for agreeableness, conscientiousness,
and extroversion.
17The qualitative results are robust to using di®erent cut o®s for classifying subjects as highly agreeable.
12Table 4: Regression: Performance (10 min. Periods) by Agreeableness Score
Data Entry Accuracy
Rate Corrected Rate
Low Agr. High Agr. Low Agr. High Agr.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Typing Speed Test Score 0.226*** 0.0590 0.188*** 0.0770
(0.0502) (0.0531) (0.0490) (0.0500)
Temps Paid High Wage ($18/hr) -4.142** 2.392 -4.294*** 2.159
(1.681) (2.675) (1.614) (2.535)
Manager Bonus -0.377 4.856 -0.167 4.224
(1.799) (3.004) (1.745) (2.870)
High Wage X Manager Bonus 5.380** 2.041 5.222** 1.332
(2.495) (2.676) (2.408) (2.562)
Period 0.0819* 0.134** 0.0522 0.0898*
(0.0433) (0.0553) (0.0419) (0.0527)
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES
Constant 16.94** 67.05*** 12.65* 58.30***
(7.113) (14.76) (6.775) (13.93)
Observations 1059 569 1059 569
Number of subject 37 20 37 20
Total E®ect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 1.237 4.433** 0.927 3.491*
(1.598) (2.165) (1.560) (2.058)
Highly Agreeable subjects are those with an agreeableness score in the top 33%. We report cross-sectional
time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1) correlation. Demographic
Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and student status. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Signi¯cance is denoted: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
this topic in Section 5.
Treatment E®ects over Time
Finally, we consider the question of how productivity evolves over time. As Gneezy and List
(2006) document a fast disappearing gift exchange pattern, we are in particular interested in
how the e®ects of the treatment variations evolve over the course of the experiment. We split
our data into ¯rst and second half observations and report in Table 5 the base regressions
13separately. Again, the qualitative results are robust to di®erent divisions of the data.18 For
both treatments the e®ect of a wage gift has in fact a more positive e®ect in the second
half of the experiment. The negative response to the wage in the No Bonus treatment only
exists in the ¯rst half, disappearing in the second half. Similarly, the positive e®ect in the
Bonus treatment is present only in the second half of the experiment. However, the strong
complementarity between the instruments, High Wage X Manager Bonus, is very stable
over time. This suggests that the positive response to gift exchange does not have to be a
short-lived phenomenon.
5 Discussion of Results
Previous ¯eld experiments studying gift exchange in the ¯eld have a variety of job situations
(e.g. one-time jobs vs. ongoing jobs), job tasks (e.g. data entry, fund raising, and tree
planting) and worker pools (e.g. students vs. full-time employees). Our results suggest that
it may not be surprising that the observed e®ect of surprise wage increases varies across the
studies. We demonstrate that a positive gift exchange can exist, but that its presence depends
on the characteristics of the job - therefore we should not expect gift exchange to be present
in all job settings. In particular, the results from our ¯eld study suggest that the extent
to which the manager will directly bene¯t when subordinates produce high output plays an
important role for the e±cacy of reciprocity and gift exchange in the ¯eld. We therefore
anticipate that gift exchange should be most prominent in settings where managers have a
strong direct bene¯t from employee e®ort, e.g. if they have performance-based monetary
incentives.
The negative e®ect on e®ort in our No Bonus treatment is admittedly puzzling. It is possible
that absent an indication that high e®ort is important to the manager the surprise high wage
appears wasteful. Subjects might interpret the out-of-context wage increase as a mistake on
our side, casting doubt on our managerial aptitude. From this they might have downwards
updated also our ability or willingness to \monitor their work". Indicating that the manager
has incentives related to output may put the decision to o®er a higher wage into context and
avoid this negative updating on aptitude.19
While we did not ex ante predict that the e®ect of a gift would get stronger over time, a few
explanations are possible. First, we observe some level of learning in all treatments. It may
take some time before workers learn their cost of e®ort, which determine how willing they are
to exert e®ort to provide a return gift to the principal. Additionally, perhaps gift exchange
18E.g., performing an hourly based analysis gives similar results.
19Moreover, Englmaier and Leider (2009) also ¯nd a negative response to a wage gift for low productivity
workers in their real e®ort lab experiment.
14Table 5: Regression: Performance (10 min. Periods) by 1st/2nd half
Data Entry Accuracy
Rate Corrected Rate
1st Half 2nd Half 1st Half 2nd Half
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Typing Speed Test Score 0.216*** 0.258*** 0.200*** 0.241***
(0.0320) (0.0360) (0.0299) (0.0341)
Temps Paid High Wage ($18/hr) -4.795*** -1.527 -4.319*** -1.581
(1.226) (1.521) (1.183) (1.423)
Manager Bonus -0.572 -1.249 -0.429 -0.460
(1.407) (1.856) (1.371) (1.778)
High Wage X Manager Bonus 5.249*** 5.406** 4.823*** 4.531**
(1.902) (2.334) (1.823) (2.237)
Period 0.578*** -0.372*** 0.532*** -0.430***
(0.0656) (0.0984) (0.0630) (0.0930)
Demographic Controls YES YES YES YES
Constant 15.91*** 25.27*** 10.67* 17.19**
(5.914) (7.458) (5.673) (7.022)
Observations 855 773 855 773
Number of subject 57 57 57 57
Total E®ect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 0.453 3.878** 0.504 2.949*
(1.324) (1.623) (1.287) (1.537)
We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and AR(1)
correlation. Demographic Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and
student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signi¯cance is denoted: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p <0.1
15raises productivity by increasing persistence, rather than maximal e®ort. As previously
mentioned, we see no treatment e®ect on quality, suggesting that workers need not improve
on all dimensions of e®ort. Lastly workers may have been waiting to see if another surprise
was coming before completely determining their e®ort level.
As in previous experiments, we do not ¯nd that the increase in worker wages \pays for
itself" in increased productivity - the 40% increase in wage only garnered a 10% increase
in productivity. However, we were using completely °at wages to pay the workers. The
theoretical model in Englmaier and Leider (2011) suggests that the level of reciprocity needed
to induce e®ort under a °at wage is generally larger than the amount of reciprocity that can
reduce agency costs when paired with explicit monetary incentives. A °at wage is generically
far from the optimal contract, and so it is quite possible that this level of reciprocity could
be much more powerfully leveraged with a more sophisticated incentive scheme. Bellemare
and Shearer (2007) ¯nd that a ¯xed gift of $80 ( 40% of earnings) on top of the standard
piece rate increased productivity by an amount worth $40. As in our study the size of the
gift was chosen arbitrarily, hence ¯ne tuning the mix of gifts and explicit incentives is likely
to be critical.
6 Conclusion
The importance of fairness and social preferences especially for the work relation has long
been documented in the lab. However, a number of recent studies have highlighted that the
empirical importance of reciprocity as a motivating force in the ¯eld crucially depends on
details of the environment. The wage gift has to stand in the proper context to unfold a
motivating e®ect. Based on a principal-agent model of reciprocal motivation we argue that
a key determinant of the e±ciency of reciprocal motivation is the ability of an agent to repay
a gift, i.e. the bene¯t accruing to the principal from high e®ort.
Our results con¯rm the importance of the speci¯c characteristics of the job setting in gener-
ating gift exchange-based incentives. If the manager stands to bene¯t much from additional
e®ort there is a strong positive e®ort response while in the absence of the managerial bene¯t
we ¯nd no or even a negative response to the wage gift. This indicates a strong complemen-
tarity between the wage gift and the managerial payo® in generating incentives for employee
e®ort. Additionally, we ¯nd that the positive response to high wages comes primarily from
high reciprocity workers (as identi¯ed by a personality test), while the negative response
comes from low reciprocity workers. We ¯nd no weakening of positive responses to wage
gifts over time. To the contrary, any negative e®ects of the wage gift disappear in the later
stages of the task and we ¯nd an overall strongly positive e®ect of our treatment manipula-
16tions.
Our study indicates that employing agents' reciprocity as a part of a ¯rms personnel policy is
a viable alternative and can be successfully done. However, as highlighted by e.g. Ichniowski
and Shaw (2003) or Bartling et al. (2011), it is important that various complementary
parts of the ¯rms compensation and HR policy are coordinated to maximize the e®ect of
reciprocity. For example, ¯rms wishing to employ reciprocal incentives may want to select
for reciprocal motivations during hiring. An interesting implication of our study is that
performance related pay for middle management should be part of a remuneration policy
even absent moral hazard problems on that hierarchy level.
Our results suggest several avenues for future research. Further empirical work could iden-
tify the optimal magnitude of the gift and the proper mix between reciprocal and explicit
motivation to maximize the pro¯tability of gift exchange. Similarly, other experiments
could examine other characteristics of the work setting that determine the e®ectiveness
of reciprocity-based incentives.
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18A Derivations
A.1 Comparative Statics
Assuming that the contract is generous, the worker's optimal e®ort choice a¤ for a given
contract is implicitly de¯ned by the ¯rst order condition




¤) + ´ (u( ~ w) ¡ c(^ a) ¡ ¹ u)M ¢ ER
0(a
¤) = 0:
Applying the implicit function theorem we can derive the relevant comparative statics w.r.t.
~ w and M:
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A.2 A simple Example
To provide a concrete example assume that




Then the worker's utility can be written as
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19B Additional Tables
Table 6: Regression: Performance (10 min. Periods) incl. Ability Dummies
(1) (2)
Data Entry Accuracy
VARIABLES Rate Corrected Rate
Slowest Third -5.451*** -4.836***
(0.987) (0.945)
Fastest Third -0.407 -0.191
(1.075) (1.038)
Temps Paid High Wage -3.541*** -3.324***
(1.131) (1.074)
Manager Bonus -2.506* -1.875
(1.340) (1.294)








Number of subject 57 57
Total E®ect: High Wage & Manager Bonus 4.312*** 3.724**
(1.215) (1.177)
We report cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedastic panel structure and
panel-speci¯c AR(1) correlation. Demographic Controls include dummy variables for gender, race, age,
work experience, and student status. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signi¯cance is denoted:
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
20C Additional Material
Figure 2: Example Page Prussian Census of 1849
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